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Existing so-called conflict-based models of executive control 
aim to explain how an agent, without constantly controlling 
its own processing (what is both cognitively costly and in-
efficient), can know when to apply strong control, but when to 
withdraw it. These models predict that the strength of control 
is adjusted proportionally to the level of conflict among 
competing stimuli/response tendencies. However, so far the 
conflict-based models were verified with the use of relatively 
simple experimental paradigms, like the Stroop task. In the 
present study, we extended the effect of evoked conflict on 
the strength of executive control, exerted by participants, to a 
more realistic task (the search of information in a portal-like 
browser). The results indicate that also semantic conflicts 
(incompatible meaning of subsequent messages) can mobilize 
executive control, and help people to cope with experienced 
distraction and difficulty. 
Introduction 
A crucial human mental faculty that is intensively studied in 
cognitive science/neuroscience is executive control (also 
called cognitive control). It allows humans to direct and 
coordinate their thoughts and actions in a flexible and novel 
way, in order to reach adopted goals, even in face of 
conflicting stimulation and strongly learned but inadequate 
response tendencies. The important role of control in human 
behavior becomes clearly visible in situations when such a 
control has been disrupted (e.g., due to illness, aging, etc.), 
and agents are no longer able to inhibit intruding thoughts or 
responses, prevent perseveration, overcome salient distract-
ion, switch between alternative tasks, or plan their actions 
(Chuderski & Nęcka, 2010; Monsell & Driver, 2000).  
Recent research efforts aim to explain how the mind/brain 
is able to internally control its own cognitive processes, 
without positing any vague and homuncular constructs like 
will, person, or self. One important conclusion from this line 
of research states that cognitive control most likely is not a 
function of one dedicated cognitive subsystem, but it seems 
to emerge from the complex interactions between diverse 
mechanisms/processes (Egner, 2008) that can be precisely 
specified in terms of formal models (Kieras & Meyer, 
1997). Work on various executive control functions spans 
from motivational psychology (Bargh, Gollwitzer, & 
Oettingen, 2010), through cognitive modeling (Cohen, 
Dunbar, & McClelland; Gray, 2007), to cognitive 
neuroscience (Alexander & Brown, 2011). What integrates 
all those efforts is the view that a crucial role in 
coordinating cognition and behavior is played by goal 
representations (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). 
However, highly controlled (goal-focused) processing is 
cognitively and energetically costly (Bargh et al., 2010), and 
sometimes (in cases of highly skilled actions) it is counter-
effective. Thus, an agent should exert control only when it is 
really necessary to perform a task (the minimum control 
principle; Taatgen, 2007). However, how an agent, without 
constantly controlling its own processing, can know when to 
apply strong control, and tightly focus on goal-relevant 
processes, but when to withdraw it, and rely primarily on 
well-learned action schemata?  
One solution to this paradox assumes that an agent just 
monitors some simple global signal (simple enough not to 
require any complex processing), which acts as a heuristic 
for the evaluation of how strong control is needed in a 
particular situation. It has been proposed that such a signal 
can rely on various measures of conflict (incongruency, 
incompability) between thoughts/actions that can be poten-
tially applied in a given situation (Berlyne, 1960). 
Since very beginnings of psychological research, the role 
of conflict in mediating control was studied in natural 
settings (henceforth we will call such settings realistic 
tasks). For example, Kurt Lewin (1935) was one of the first 
to investigate the conflicts between so called helping and 
hindering forces acting on a person, moving her or him 
either toward or away the adopted goal (the approach-
avoidance conflicts). Lewin’s student, Festinger (1957), 
formalized the level of conflict (dissonance in his terminolo-
gy) between incongruent psychological entities, identifying 
three factors affecting the perceived conflict level: (i) the 
magnitude of dissonance, (ii) its importance for a person, 
and (iii) how difficult to resolve is a particular dissonance. 
Motivation to counteract the causes of dissonance was a 
positive function of the level of conflict expressed in such a 
way. Festinger (and his followers) explained many real-
world psychological phenomena by using the above 
conceptualization of conflict. 
However, one disadvantage of studying the relationship 
between perceived conflict and executive control is the fact 
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that realistic tasks usually do not provide sufficient experi-
mental control required to carry out more fine-grained 
cognitive and neurofunctional research, and in particular – 
to verify precise computational models of control. Thus, this 
type of research usually uses simpler laboratory tasks, like 
the Stroop task and its variants (MacLeod, 1991). This task 
consists of presenting bivalent stimuli (e.g., colored words 
that themselves name colors), which include a less-learned 
(non-dominant) aspect (i.e., a color) and a more-learned 
(dominant) aspect (i.e, a name of a color), and require 
participants to process and respond to the non-dominant 
aspect (i.e., naming colors), while ignoring the dominant 
one (i.e., not reading color names).  
The crucial observation in Stroop, called the congruency 
effect, consists of increased response latency in incongruent 
trials, for example when the color denoted by a word 
mismatches the ink color, compared to RT in neutral trials, 
for instance when the color of a color-unrelated string, like 
‘XXXXX’, has to be named. The effect is even larger if the 
incongruent trials are compared to trials in which ink color 
and the word meaning match (to congruent trials). Because 
of its simplicity (simple stimuli displayed, and only a few 
vocal/manual responses required), the Stroop task (and 
similar tests) have been widely used to examine the theories 
and models (i.e., conflict-based models of executive control; 
e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Davelaar, 2008; Smolen & Chuderski, 2010; Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2008) suggesting that the perceived level of 
conflict affects the strength of executive control, and the 
congruency effect is inversely proportional to that strength. 
Two experimental effects found in Stroop studies were 
especially interpreted as resulting from differences in the 
evaluated conflict level. The Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles, 
& Donchin, 1992) shows that the congruency effect 
decreases in trials presented after incongruent stimuli, in 
comparison to trials following congruent stimuli (i.e., in the 
former case, the incongruent trials become faster, often 
accompanied by slower congruent trials). The Gratton effect 
was explained (Botvinick et al., 2001) as resulting from a 
higher strength of control passing from (N-1)th incongruent 
trial (where it is adjusted by the conflict between alternative 
responses to a color and to a word) to Nth trial. In contrast, 
when (N-1)th trial is congruent, no additional control is 
exerted when Nth trial occurs, so the resulting level of 
control in the latter trial is lower overall, and it yields a 
longer response latency (and so a larger congruency effect). 
Thus, Gratton effect reflects phasic changes in control. 
Moreover, the congruency effect can be decreased by an 
increasing proportion of incongruent trials in the sequence 
(Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992). This effect is interpreted 
in terms of tonic strength of control, which is permanently 
increased due to frequently occurring incongruent trials, 
which prevent control from decay (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
In general, the conflict-based models of executive control 
explain these two effects as reflecting the adaptation of 
control processes to the perceived level of conflict. 
Goals of the study 
The aim of the present study is to show that the above 
mentioned relationship between conflict and control can 
also be found in a more complex and ecologically valid test 
of executive control, that is, in a realistic task. At the same 
time, this task will still be computer-administered, thus 
potentially allowing for precise manipulations of task 
parameters (e.g., proportions of certain stimuli, presentation 
times, the nature of evoked conflict, feedback, etc.).  
First, if conflicts evoked within such a task affect the 
indices of executive control performance, this fact will 
imply that the predictions of conflict-based models of 
executive control observed so far can be generalized onto 
more complex and higher-level processes, supporting the 
psychological plausibility of these models. Also, the novel 
knowledge about operation of executive control in realistic 
tasks will allow us to design such tasks in a better way (e.g., 
in a way in which they impose less load on executive 
control or working memory), so it will have important 
practical implications.  
Second, the conflicts evoked in our task will consist of the 
semantic incongruency between presented stimuli, whereas 
these incongruent stimuli will not yield incompatible motor 
responses (they will just lead to cognitive dissonance). As 
so far most of conflict-based models of control accounted 
only for conflicts at the stimulus (Davelaar, 2008) or 
response level (Botvinick et al., 2001; Verguts & Notebaert, 
2008), a potential observation of semantic conflicts influ-
encing the strength of control will substantially extend the 
scope of theories of control based on conflict evaluation.  
Especially, our own computational model (Smolen & 
Chuderski, 2010) assumes that conflicts can occur at almost 
each stage of cognitive processing (conceptual, semantic, 
memorial). So, the expected observation will support this 
model to a large extent, in comparison to alternative models, 
predicting that only events at a stimulus/response stage 
matter for the evaluation of control strength. 
One challenge for a study of executive control in natural 
settings is the design of a realistic task that, on one hand, 
can be applied using a computer, and requires relatively 
simple reactions (e.g., with a mouse), whereas on the other 
hand it is still ‘realistic’, in the sense that it resembles 
activities that most of people do for a certain part of a day at 
their work or at home. Our choice was a tool that requires 
both searching and reading the short portions of information 
(both textual and graphical) within a simplified internet 
portal, in order to fulfill a task of gathering as much relevant 
knowledge on a given (realistic) problem as possible, and 
eventually answering one precise question regarding that 
problem. The crucial manipulation in such a task consists of 
introducing a certain amount of semantic incompatibility 
between target passages of text (some passages negate 
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others). We expected increased semantic incompatibility 
(i.e., the conflict on a conceptual level) to increase the 
strength of exerted control, which in effect would help to 
deal with a higher distraction – a factor that likely would 
affect negatively the goal-relevant performance, if not 
prevented by strong executive control. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 46 women and 36 men participated (82 people). 
All of them were recruited via adds on social networking 
webpages. Mean age was 22.8 years (SD = 3.38, range 18 – 
38). For a two-hour session each participant received the 
equivalent of ten euro in local currency. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Materials and design 
The screen in the task was composed of 3 × 3 matrix of 
locations. The task consisted of four problems. In a parti-
cular problem, the initial screen consisted of nine messages. 
Each message was placed in one of the matrix cells. In 
subsequent cycles, every 5 s, a random message was sub-
stituted with another message. In total, 100 messages were 
presented in one problem (including the initial messages).  
Messages could belong to one of four categories. Regular 
target messages were short passages of text (not shorter than 
120 characters) providing an information relevant for a 
problem to be solved (see below). For instance, a regular 
target message A could state that ‘company X expects more 
sales next year and prepares for that fact’. However, a 
certain number of target messages (conflicting target 
messages) negated regular target messages that directly 
preceded them (e.g., message B: ‘X expects less sales next 
year and will cut costs’, directly following – that is, not 
separated by any other target message – message A).  
Another category were distractor messages, which were 
text messages (30%) which conveyed information super-
ficially associated with the problem, but in fact irrelevant 
for it (e.g., ‘sales employees of X won soccer cup in the 
2013 sales departments competition’), attractive graphics 
(30%; either funny cartoons or erotic images of young pretty 
women/handsome men), or text jokes (40%). Distractor 
messages were intended to capture attention of participants, 
what might result in missing target messages, as the latter 
disappeared from the screen after certain time (depending 
on the number of cycles that it was displayed for).  
The last category were noise messages, which conveyed 
either text information irrelevant for the problem, but in no 
way conflicting or distracting (e.g., ‘several national parks 
have been founded in Poland in recent years’), or images of 
supposedly not distracting objects and landscapes. The use 
of both the distractor and noise messages made the contents 
of the task relatively similar to internet portals, which 
usually contain a lot of irrelevant textual and graphical 
information. The example screen of the task, including all 
types of messages, is presented in Fig. 1. 
The task of each participant was to monitor and read 
messages that can be potentially informative with regard to 
the problem presented to her or him in an instruction. 
Participants were also instructed that they have to confirm 
with the computer mouse the fact that a certain message is a 
message conveying an important knowledge on the problem 
(by clicking on that message). At the beginning of the 
experiment, the participants were informed that after the 
computerized part of the test they would be provided with 
messages they chose, and they would have to answer a 
question about presented problems. Answering the question 
consisted of providing the subjective probability of the 
confirmative answer to this question.  
The number of conflicting target messages and the 
number of distractor messages were two crucial task 
parameters. In the no-conflict condition, there were 30 
regular target messages defined for a particular problem, but 
no conflicting target messages were presented. In the 
conflict condition, half of 20 regular target messages 
(randomly picked up from the pool of 30 messages) was 
followed by the corresponding conflicting target message 
(so, there were also 30 targets in total, but some their pairs 
were mutually incompatible semantically). In the low-
distraction condition, there were 10 distractor messages/ 
images in a run, whereas in the high-distraction condition as 
much as 60 such messages/images were presented. In order 
to obtain the 100-message/image sequences, in the former 
condition 60 noise messages/images were used, whereas in 
the latter – 10 such messages/images were included. For 
each participant and problem, the distractor and noise 
messages/images were picked up on random from a pool of 
1186 distractor and 1500 noise messages/images. 
The problems were formulated as follows: ‘On a basis of 
information provided in a task, please …’: 
• analyze new investment of IT company X in a mobile 
phone system, and judge the probability that X will 
increase its headcount due to this investment; 
• describe how the human cortex works; 
• tell how computer processor works; 
• evaluate what factors have the most important role in 
supporting the existing political system in Ukraine. 
Noteworthy, in order to be maximally interesting for 
participants, the problems pertained to diverse topics. 
Thus, in the present experiment, the independent variables 
were: semantic conflict (either present or absent), and dist-
raction (either low or high). For each participant, all 
possible problems and conditions were combined on 
random, resulting in the 2 × 2 ‘within-subjects’ design. 
First, we expected that distraction would significantly 
decrease performance accuracy (i.e., people will be looking 
at erotic pictures or jokes instead of selecting the target 
messages). Second, we expected that the magnitude of the 
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distraction effect (i.e., accuracy on low distraction minus 
high distraction condition) in the no-conflict condition 
would be attenuated by increased control in the conflict-
condition (i.e., people, after detecting conflicts, would focus 
more on the task, and would better ignore distractors). Thus, 
we expected the two-way interaction analogous to the 
Gratton effect in Stroop. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in a large, dimly lit room, in groups 
of up to ten people. Standard PC workstations with 17’ LCD 
monitors were used for the test. Each participant occupied a 
visually isolated desk, and she or he was asked to adopt the 
most comfortable sitting position. 
The primary dependent variable (DV) was the proportion 
of missed regular target messages (i.e., error rate) in each 
problem, corrected (i.e., increased) by the weighted 
proportion (with the weight reflecting the ratio of targets to 
non-targets; i.e., noise and distractor messages) of incorrect-
ly identified non-targets (see Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). 
The correction was meant to reflect the individual response 
tendencies of participants (i.e., people who generally tended 
to respond more often had also a larger chance to hit the 
target). Where explicitly indicated, analyses additionally 
































Fig. 1: A demonstration of a screen in the realistic task used in the experiment, with particular types of messages that were 
presented in the task marked with arrows (note that no arrows were shown in the original screens). Texts represent English 
translations of the original messages (in the experiment, the task was administered in Polish). 
 
Results 
The mean proportion of errors was .33 (SD = .11). It ranged 
from M = .15 to M = .64 for particular participants. This 
data indicates that participants generally understood and 
followed instructions for the task, and the individual 
differences in task performance were not substantial. Data 
for specific conditions of the task are presented in Table. 
 
 
Distraction: Low High 
No-conflict condition .25 (.13) .41 (.20) 
Conflict condition .31 (.14) .36 (.15) 
Conflicting targets in 
conflict condition .46 (.24) .45 (.22) 
Table: Mean error rate (and SD) in all conditions of the task.  
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Data regarding regular target messages were submitted to 
ANOVA. In the case of errors, two factors yielded 
significant main effects. First, in the high distraction  
condition participants missed target messages more often  
(M = .39) than in the low distraction condition (M = .28), 
F(1, 81) = 55.59, p < .001, η2 = .41. This fact implied that  
superficially similar texts, funny cartoons, and erotic 
images, originally aimed to capture people’s attention,  
indeed diverted participants from fulfilling the task, and 
constituted the substantial source of interference for the 
executive system to cope with. Second, there was no 
significant difference in errors between the conflict and no-
conflict conditions, F(1, 81) = 0.12, meaning that conflict 
did not affect the accuracy of recognition of regular target 
messages per se.  
As expected, in the conflict condition participants missed 
the conflicting target messages more often (M = .46) than 
they missed the regular target messages (M = .31), 
F(1, 81) = 58.80, p < .001, η2 = .42. This effect indicates 
that they indeed detected semantic incompatibility between 
consecutive target messages, and often decided that a 
incompatible message was irrelevant for the solution of the 
current problem (so they did not click on it). 
In light of our hypotheses, the most important effects 
pertained to the two-way interactive effect of factors, which 
was significant F(1, 81) = 15.24, p < .001, η2 = .94. Tukey’s 
HSD test showed that high and low distraction conditions 
differed both in no-conflict (p < .001) and conflict 
(p = .008) conditions as well as conflict and no-conflict 
conditions differed both in low distraction (p = .009) and 
high distraction (p = .009) conditions. The interaction is 





















Fig. 2: Mean error rate of regular target message detection 
in the conflict versus no-conflict condition, for low- (green 
line) versus high-distraction (red line) conditions. Bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
Our hypotheses assumed that increased perception of 
conflict, evoked by placing the semantically incompatible 
messages within the stream of information presented to 
participants, would affect the effects possibly yielded by 
factors that load executive control mechanisms, which 
might be responsible for dealing with our realistic task. We 
obtained strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis. 
Increased distraction made people to respond less correctly, 
but this effect was attenuated by increased conflict. In line 
with the conflict-based models of control, we attribute this 
interaction to additional strength of control, which was 
‘mobilized’ and, thus, control became more effective when 
participants started facing semantic conflicts. 
 Thus, these results are pretty analogous to the Gratton 
effect observed in various tests of executive control. 
However, as far as we know, now for the first time they 
have been observed within a much more complex task than 
such tests, that is, within a task that in a way resembles 
natural situations of information acquisition and selection. 
 The theoretical implications of the present work pertain to 
the verification of the above mentioned conflict-based 
models of executive control. Extending their predictions to a 
(more or less) realistic task suggests that perceived conflict 
(in stimulation or between mental representations/response 
tendencies) may indeed be a type of signal that is evaluated 
for the sake of optimizing the strength of exerted control. 
Thus, our study seems to extend and generalize predictions 
of the conflict-based models of control. Especially, the 
results in some way support a key assumption of our own 
conflict-based model, which predicts that not only response- 
(see Botvinick et al., 2001) or stimulation-based conflicts 
(see Davelaar, 2008) modulate executive control, but it can 
also be influenced by conflicts regarding semantic or 
conceptual incongruency between cognitive processes (i.e., 
conflict related to memory/higher-level cognition). 
However, it must be noted that conflicts may not be the 
only type of signal that can regulate executive control. Other 
accounts, for instance models that in regulating control rely 
on the learned (via reinforcement learning) likelihood of 
negative outcomes like errors or risky actions (Brown & 
Braver, 2007), or the discrepancy between predicted 
response outcomes and the outcomes that are actually 
experienced (Alexander & Brown, 2011), were proposed in 
literature, and successfully fitted to observed data regarding 
executive control. It is also likely that the human brain 
evolved to use various mechanisms that regulate executive 
control, and the comprehensive model of human control 
should integrate them all. For example, regulation based on 
reinforcement learning may be effective if an agent has a 
rich experience with a particular kind of situation (e.g., a 
risky one), that is, it had a lot occasions to learn. However, 
in completely novel situations, when learning was not 
possible yet, conflict-based regulation may be a better 
regulative mechanism to use. 
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 In conclusion, the present study in an original way 
combined the precise manipulation of factors possibly 
affecting the workings of human executive control mecha-
nisms with the relatively complex, higher-level realistic 
task. Future steps in the present line of research should 
extend the examination of variables possibly influencing 
executive control, which are based on evoked conflict, to 
even more realistic settings. In this regard, the development 
of virtual reality platforms constitutes a very promising 
research tool that should be further exploited. Knowledge 
on factors negatively (or positively) affecting the internal 
control of human cognitive processing in natural settings 
may also help to design better human-computer interfaces, 
vehicle cockpits, etc. 
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